Gender and Economic Inequality in India: The Legal Connection by Gopal, Gita
Boston College Third World Law Journal
Volume 13 | Issue 1 Article 3
1-1-1993
Gender and Economic Inequality in India: The
Legal Connection
Gita Gopal
Follow this and additional works at: http://lawdigitalcommons.bc.edu/twlj
Part of the Foreign Law Commons, and the Women Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at Digital Commons @ Boston College Law School. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Boston College Third World Law Journal by an authorized administrator of Digital Commons @ Boston College Law School. For more
information, please contact nick.szydlowski@bc.edu.
Recommended Citation
Gita Gopal, Gender and Economic Inequality in India: The Legal Connection, 13 B.C. Third World L.J.
63 (1993), http://lawdigitalcommons.bc.edu/twlj/vol13/iss1/3
GENDER AND ECONOMIC INEQUALITY IN 
INDIA: THE LEGAL CONNECTION 
DR. GITA GOPAL· 
I. INTRODUCTION..................................................... 63 
II. THE INDIAN LEGAL SYSTEM. . . . . • . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . • . . . . . . 65 
A. The Indian Legal System. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 65 
B. The Constitution and Personal Laws.............................. 67 
C. The Challenge for Women: Social vs. Economic Laws............... 68 
III. WOMEN'S PROPERTY RIGHTS UPON MARRIAGE. • . . . . . . . . . . • . . . . . . . • . 69 
A. Dowry and Stridhan: The Introduction to Property ................ 69 
B. A Wife'S Economic Rights. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 72 
IV. WOMEN'S PROPERTY RIGHTS UPON DIVORCE. • . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . • 75 
V. GENDER AND PROPERTY RIGHTS UPON DEATH...................... 78 
A. Right to Inherit Property Irj Will. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 78 
B. Right to Inherit Property Upon Intestacy. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 79 
1. Women's Right to Inherit Joint Family Property........... 80 
2. Women's Right to the Dwelling House. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 82 
3. Property Succession of Male and Female Intestates. . . . . . . . . 82 
C. Widows' Property Rights . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 83 
VI. WOMEN'S ABILITY TO OWN AGRICULTURAL LAND................... 84 
VII. CONCLUSION........................................................ 86 
A woman is never fit for independence; her father protects her in childhood, 
her husband protects her in her youth, and her sons protect her in her old 
age. l 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The definition and institutionalization of equal rights at law is 
an important tool to combat the high degree of gender inequality 
in India. Gender equality is a constitutional mandate and many laws 
have been passed to improve the traditionally inferior social and 
• M.A., 1976, L.L.B., 1980, Kerala University; L.L.M., 1981, S.J.D., 1988, Harvard 
University. Dr. Gopal is an Advocate in the Supreme Court of India and an attorney in 
Virginia. The author wishes to gratefully acknowledge the comments of Ms. Nena Manley 
on an earlier draft of this article. 
I G. BUHLER, THE LAws OF MANU 195 (F. Max Muller ed., 1990). Hindu law is based 
upon the Manusmritis or code of Man, of which Manu is the author. [d. According to the 
laws of Manu a woman must worship her husband as God even if he is a womanizer. NEERA 
DESAI & MAITHREYI KIuSHNARAJ, WOMEN AND SOCIETY IN INDIA 28-29 (1987). A woman also 
should be kept dependent by her husband because she is passionate and disloyal by nature. 
[d. at 29. 
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economic status of women. Only a few privileged women benefit 
from this legal reform. Such legal reform includes the right to 
receive equal pay,2 to receive maternity benefits,3 to own or inherit 
property,4 to terminate unwanted pregnancies,5 and to be protected 
from cruelty at the hand of husbands through divorce or judicial 
separation.6 
These legislative reforms have perpetuated a myth that Indian 
women occupy a high status in Indian society.7 The reality is, how-
ever, that legislation has not improved everyday life for the majority 
of women. Seventy-one percent of Indian women are illiterate.s 
Ninety percent of the female labor force works in the underpaid 
and largely unregulated sectors of the economy.9 A majority of 
women hold little or no property in their own names. Economically, 
socially, and politically, women remain at the lowest strata of society 
in India. 
The inferior status of women in India is often attributed to the 
ineffective and inadequate implementation of existing laws. 1o While 
this is a problem, the key factor is the interrelation between legis-
lation and the treatment of women: many gender biased legislative 
2 The Equal Renumeration Act, No. 25 (1976) (India), reprinted in P.L. MALIK, INDUSTRIAL 
LAw 821 (1990). 
'The Maternity Benefits Act, No. 53 (1961) (India), as amended by Act Nos. 51 of 1970, 
21 of 1972, 52 of 1973, 53 of 1976, and Act 61 of 1988, reprinted in MALIK, supra note 2, at 
1309; The Employees' State Insurance Act, No. 34 (1948) (India) § 50, reprinted in MALIK, 
supra note 2, at 609. 
4 Hindu Succession Act, No. 30 (1956) (India), reprinted in ALLAHABAD LAw AGENCY, 
NEW ACTS OF HINDU LAw (1992). 
5 Medical Termination of Pregnancy Act of 1971 § 3 (wife does not need husband's 
consent to terminate pregnancy). 
6 Hindu Marriage Act, No. 25 (1955) (India), reprinted in ALLAHABAD LAW AGENCY, NEW 
ACTS OF HINDU LAW (1992); INDIA PEN. CODE § 498-A. Cruelty is any willful conduct by a 
husband, or a relative of the husband, which is likely to drive the woman to commit suicide 
or to cause grave injury or danger to her life, limb, or health. Id. 
7 DESAI & KRISHNARAj, supra note 1, at 46. 
8 GOVERNMENT OF INDIA, MINISTRY OF INFORMATION AND BROADCASTING, RESEARCH AND 
REFERENCE DIVISION, INDIA 1991, A REFERENCE ANNUAL 13 (1992) [hereinafter INDIA 1991]. 
This figure refers to the 1981 census. 
9 GOVERNMENT OF INDIA, SHRAMSAKTHI, REpORT OF THE NATIONAL COMMISSION ON SELF-
EMPLOYED WOMEN 28 (1988) [hereinafter SHRAMSAKTHI REpORT]. The female labor force also 
has little occupational diversification. According to a 1981 census, approximately 79.4% of 
female workers are engaged in agricultural activities, mainly as laborers. Id. The large female 
representation in the agricultural sector can be misleading, as this type of employment is not 
an adequate substitute for challenging employment by which women can become financially 
independent. 
10 See Meredith Sherman Fahn, Noncompliance with India's Dowry Prohibition Act of 1961: A 
Society's Reactions to Impased Law, 4 TEMPLE INT'L & COMPo L.J. 101, 120-129 (1990). 
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provisions, despite the constitutional guarantee of equality, continue 
to reiterate traditional feudal attitudes about women's property 
rights and fail to provide women with equal access to economic 
resources. The focus must be shifted towards the basis of discrim-
inatory legislative provisions to understand why legislation perpet-
uates the economic dependency of women on men. 
To illustrate this economic dependence of women, this article 
analyzes the role of modern legislation in defining property rights 
of Hindu women in India. ll It examines the interrelations between 
law and women's economic status within the family. This article 
submits that while law technically confers an equal social status on 
women, it also constrains the potential development of women by 
sustaining patriarchal norms, thereby denying women the access to 
economic resources outside the family, and providing an inequitable 
distribution of property within the family.12 Part II provides a brief 
overview of the Indian legal system in order to provide background 
necessary to understand the impact of the courts on women's prop-
erty rights. Part III discusses women's property rights related to 
marriage. Part IV explores women's property rights upon divorce. 
Part V explains gender and property rights upon death: it begins 
with the devolution of property through testamentary powers and 
then focuses upon gender inequalities in the intestacy context. Part 
VI discusses the institutionalized discrimination that prevents equal 
opportunities to own land. This article concludes that legal reform 
must be approached with the goal of eliminating underlying patriar-
chal beliefs that exist in many of India's modern laws concerning 
the economic rights of women. 
II. THE INDIAN LEGAL SYSTEM 
A. The Indian Legal System l3 
The Constitution of India, adopted by the Constituent Assem-
bly on November 26, 1949, came into force on January 26, 1950. 
11 Hindu law only applies to Hindus. See infra text accompanying note 24. India's pop-
ulation consists of Hindus (82.6%), Muslims (11.4%), Christians (2.4%), and Sikhs, Buddhists, 
Jains and other minorities (3.6%). INDIA 1991, supra note 8, at 18. 
12 This article confines itself to an examination of economic rights of Hindu women 
within the family structure. For an examination of women within the workplace, see DESAI 
& KRISHNARAj, supra note I, at 50-136. For a detailed analysis of Indian women's political 
progress, see LESLIE J. CALMAN, TOWARD EMPOWERMENT: WOMEN AND MOVEMENT POLITICS 
IN INDIA (1992). 
13 See INDIA 1991, supra note 8, at 25,32,52,784-89; MARC GALANTER, LAw AND SOCIETY 
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The Constitution guarantees fundamental rights-certain basic 
freedoms-to all citizens individually and collectively.14 These in-
clude the right to equality before the law,15 prohibition of discrim-
ination by the State on grounds of religion, race, caste, sex, or place 
of birth, 16 and equality of opportunity in matters concerning public 
employmentP 
The Constitution divides legislative powers between the Union 
and twenty-five states. The Indian Constitution is quasi-federal in 
that it is applicable to all states. 1S The Union government has exclu-
sive powers to legislate on matters enumerated in List I of the 
seventh schedule of the Constitution.19 The state governments have 
exclusive jurisdiction over matters enumerated in List II of the 
seventh schedule.20 The Union and the states have concurrent pow-
ers over matters in List III of the seventh schedule.21 Personal or 
customary laws in List III govern matters such as marriage, divorce, 
intestacy, succession, joint family and partition, and adoption.22 
Consequently, personal laws applicable to Hindus in one state need 
not necessarily be applicable to Hindus in other states. 
There is an integrated system of courts to administer both 
Union and state laws. At the apex of the judicial system is the 
Supreme Court of India (Supreme Court). There is a High Court 
in each state or group of states. The Supreme Court has original, 
appellate, and advisory jurisdictions. Appellate jurisdiction can be 
invoked in matters involving a constitutional question or questions 
of law of general importance, or if a High Court is of the opinion 
that a question needs to be decided by the Supreme Court. Under 
each High Court there is a hierarchy of subordinate courts with the 
High Court having supervisory powers over all courts within its 
jurisdiction. 
IN MODERN INDIA (Rajeev Dhavan ed., 1989); THE INDIAN LAw INSTITUTE, THE INDIAN LEGAL 
SYSTEM (Joseph Minattur ed., 1978). 
14 INDIA CONST. pt. III. 
IS /d. art. 14. 
161d. art. 15(1). 
17/d. art. 16. 
18 See DR. DURGA DAS BASU, INTRODUCTION TO THE CONSTITUTION OF INDIA 30 (1976). 
19DURGA DAS BASU, CONSTITUTIONAL LAw OF INDIA 496 (1977). 
20 Id. at 507. 
21/d. at 515. 
22 See Paras Diwan, Family Law, in THE INDIAN LEGAL SYSTEM 633 (Joseph Minattur ed., 
1978). 
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B. The Constitution and Personal Laws 
Article 44 of the Constitution makes it a directive policy of the 
states "to endeavor to secure for the citizens a uniform civil code 
throughout the territory of India."23 This has not been achieved: 
each religious group in India is governed by separate personal 
laws.24 Hindu personal laws have been codified by the federal and 
state governments. 25 Many provisions in such laws, however, reflect 
gender biases prevalent in traditional Hindu law, which clearly con-
travene the constitutional guarantees of gender equality.26 Accord-
ing to Article 13(1), the courts have the power to declare that all 
"laws in force" before the Constitution are void if they conflict with 
these fundamental rights. 27 State legislation that abridges funda-
mental rights is also void. 28 
The courts, however, have been reluctant to hold that gender 
bias in personal laws rises to the level of a constitutional violation. 
In State of Bombay v. Narasu Appa Mali,29 for example, the court had 
to decide the validity of the Bombay Prevention of Hindu Bigamous 
Marriage Act of 1946 which did not apply to polygamous Muslims. 
The petitioner argued that Article 13 of the Constitution rendered 
personal Muslim law permitting polygamy void because the Muslim 
law violated Article 15(1)'s prohibition of sex discrimination. 30 The 
court rejected this argument and upheld the validity of the Hindu 
statute on two grounds. First, the court held that the Constitution 
excludes personal law from the purview of Article 13.31 Second, 
even if the term "laws in force" included personal laws, the practice 
of polygamy would not violate Article 15(1) because the article is 
based on "vital and compelling" social, economic, and religious 
grounds, and not on grounds of gender.32 
23 INDIA CONST. art. 44. 
24 Diwan, supra note 22, at 633-34. 
25 Hindu Marriage Act, supra note 6; Hindu Succession Act, supra note 4; Hindu Adop-
tion and Maintenance Act, No. 78 (1956) (India), reprinted in ALLAHABAD LAW AGENCY, NEW 
ACTS OF HINDU LAW (1992); Hindu Minority and Guardianship Act, No. 32 (1956) (India), 
reprinted in ALLAHABAD LAW AGENCY, NEW ACTS OF HINDU LAW (1992). 
26 See infra parts III & IV (Hindu Marriage Act); part IV (Hindu Adoption and Main-
tenance Act); part V.B (Hindu Succession Act); part VI (land reform laws). 
27 INDIA CONST. art. 13(1). For an in-depth discussion on the scope of Article 13, see DR. 
DURGA DAS BASU, SHORTER CONSTITUTION OF INDIA 63-65 (1989). 
28 INDIA CONST. art. 13(2). 
29 1952 A.I.R. 84 (Born.). 
30 [d. at 88. 
31 [d. at 89. 
32 [d. But see Krishna Singh v. Mathura Ahir, 1980 A.I.R. 707 (S.C.) (Supreme Court 
indicated in dicta that part III of the Constitution does not affect personal law). 
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Courts have also been reluctant to apply constitutional princi-
ples to statutory provisions affecting the domestic domain. For in-
stance, in Kaur v. Chaudhary33 the issue was whether the statutory 
remedy of the restitution of conjugal rights violated the constitu-
tional right of "personal liberty" in Article 2l. 34 The Delhi High 
Court held that "in the privacy of the home and the married life 
neither Article 21 nor Article 14 have any place. "35 Upon review, 
the Supreme Court affirmed the decision, but did not address the 
question of whether constitutional principles apply to the home. 
A recent ray of hope was seen in In re Amina,36 a decision by a 
single judge bench of the Bombay High Court. The Amina judge 
held that the Narasu Appa Mali decision was erroneous and that 
personal laws must also be subject to fundamental rightsY The 
judge requested that this matter of public importance be heard by 
a larger bench. 38 While the matter appears straightforward, the 
religious and political underpinnings may prevent it from being 
taken up for further discussion. Nevertheless, it remains a matter 
of crucial importance for Indian women and requires resolution in 
order to achieve gender equality. 
C. The Challenge for Women: Social vs. Economic Laws 
Despite this existing confusion over whether constitutional 
principles are applicable to personal laws, the concept of gender 
equality has found significant legislative acceptance in redefining 
the social status of Hindu women, even in the realm of personal 
law. For example, the concept of equality prevails within the home, 
as the law refuses to accord men higher social status over women.39 
Id. 
331984 A.I.R. 66 (Del.). 
34 Article 21 protects life and personal liberty. INDIA CON ST. 
35 Kaur, 1984 A.I.R. at 75. The court further stated: 
Introduction of constitutional law in the home is most inappropriate. . . . In a 
sensitive sphere which is at once intimate and delicate the introduction of cold 
principles of constitutional law will have the effect of weakening the marriage bond. 
36 1992 A.I.R. 215 (Born.). 
37Id. at 219. 
38Id. at 222. 
39 See, e.g., Hindu Succession Act, supra note 4, § 14 (both spouses may hold and alienate 
property), § 30 (both spouses have full testamentary powers over their property); Hindu 
Marriage Act, supra note 6, § 13(1) (both spouses may sue for divorce on identical grounds), 
§ 25(1) (both spouses may sue for maintenance), and § 9 (both spouses may sue for judicial 
restitution of conjugal rights); The Suppression of Immoral Traffic in Women and Girls Act, 
No. 104 (1956) (India) (prohibits immoral trafficking of women and protects the victims of 
prostitution); INDIA PEN. CODE § 498-A (cruelty by husband is a criminal offense); The Dowry 
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The constitutional guarantee of equality is therefore partially ful-
filled. Indian women enjoy a social status of equality under the law 
that is enviable when compared with the position of women in other 
deveIoping countries, and in some aspects, in developed countries. 
To enjoy such social status it is important that women have access 
to economic resources. Legislation regulating such access, however, 
is not based on standards of equality. Legal reform has sustained 
patriarchal norms and has fostered the dependence of women 
through their economic marginalization. Equality is sometimes 
overtly rejected, as legislative provisions may express a clear pref-
erence for males. In other cases, equality is covertly rejected by 
imposing gender blind norms upon an inherently unequal socio-
economic relationship, which strengthens the powerful male inter-
est. Parts III-VI illustrate the inequitable relationship between 
women and access to property within the family structure. 
III. WOMEN'S PROPERTY RIGHTS UPON MARRIAGE 
A. Dowry and Stridhan: The Introduction to Property 
Traditionally, a woman had access to, and control over, any 
stridhan she received upon marriage.40 Stridhan is movable property 
voluntarily presented to the bride from her family and friends. It 
consists mainly of jewelry, money, and clothing.41 While a woman 
does not have a legal right to receive stridhan, customary rules place 
an obligation on her family to provide her with some property upon 
marriage. The practice of stridhan has changed over the years and 
has been replaced by the concept of dowry: a price paid to the 
bridegroom's family in connection with the marriage. The size and 
nature of the dowry often controls the bargaining and finalization 
of the marriage plans. The custom of dowry places women in sit-
uations of unconscionable stress and violence. Young women some-
Prohibition Act, No. 28 of 1961 (India) § 4, reprinted in JUSTICE B.P. BERI, COMMENTARIES 
ON THE DOWRY PROHIBITION ACT, 1961 127-35 (1988) (asking for a dowry is a punishable 
offense); Medical Termination of Pregnancy Act, supra note 5, § 3 (husband's consent not 
required for medical termination of pregnancy); The Maternity Benefits Act, supra note 3 
(provides maternity leave); The Factories Act, No. 63 (1948) (India), reprinted in MALIK, supra 
note 2, at 856 (provides maternity leave); The Mines Act, No. 35 (1952) (India), reprinted in 
MALIK, supra note 2, at 1339 (provides maternity leave); The Plantation Act (1951), reprinted 
in MALIK, supra note 2, at 1709 (provides creches). 
40 For a detailed discussion on the nature of stridhan, see BERI, supra note 39, at 289-
473; A.S. ALTEKAR, THE POSITION OF WOMEN IN HINDU CIVILIZATION 217-33 (2d ed. 1987). 
41 See Fahn, supra note 10, at 119. 
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times commit suicide to release their parents from the burden of 
dowry or to escape the emotional pressure from their inlaws' request 
for additional dowry.42 Another far-reaching effect of dowry abuse 
is the rise in female infanticide.43 
In 1961, the Parliament responded to these increasing atrocit.ies 
by enacting the Dowry Prohibition Act,44 which prohibits the giving 
or taking of any dowry in connection with marriage.45 Merely de-
manding a dowry is a punishable offense.46 Any person other than 
the woman who receives a dowry holds it in trust for the benefit of 
the woman.47 A judicial magistrate may act upon a complaint reg-
istered by a recognized welfare institution or organization.48 One 
accused of taking or demanding a dowry has the burden of proof. 49 
The judge has the discretion to grant bail and set the amount. 50 If 
a woman dies an unnatural death within seven years of her mar-
riage, any dowry received by her or on her behalf will be transferred 
to her children, if any, or to her parents.51 Further, the Indian Penal 
Code has codified the offense of dowry death-a woman dying of 
unnatural causes under harassment by her husband or any rela-
tive.52 The Evidence Act also has been amended so that the person 
accused of committing a dowry death is presumed guilty when it is 
42Id. at 113. 
43 Female Infanticide in Rajasthan, INDIA SPEAKS, Oct. 8, 1992, at 21, provides a chilling 
story: 
The Rajput families have only one daughter each. Only the eldest daughter is 
allowed to survive as it is difficult to get a daughter married. The women admit that 
almost every family in the village is guilty of murdering their second daughter. 
See generally John Van Willigen & V.C. Channa, Law, Custom, and Crimes Against Women: The 
Problem of Dowry Death in India, 50 HUM. ORGANIZATION 369, 370 (1991). 
44 Dowry Prohibition Act, supra note 39. 
45Id. § 4. Dowry is: 
[AJny property or valuable security given or agreed to be given either directly or 
indirectly (a) by one party to a marriage to another party to the marriage or (b) by 
the parents of either party to a marriage or by any other person, to either party to 
the marriage or to any other person at or before or any time after the marriage. 
Id. § 2. There are certain exceptions. For example, gifts voluntarily given at the time of 
marriage, entered on a list made for this purpose, granted by relatives of the bride, and 
having values that are not excessive with respect to the financial status of the donor are of a 
"customary nature." Id. § 3. 
46Id. § 4. 
47Id. § 6. 
48Id. § 7(c). 
49Id. § 8-A. 
50 See id. § 8(2). 
51 Id. § 6(3). 
52 INDIA PEN. CODE § 304-B (1986). 
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shown that a woman has been subjected to cruelty or harassment 
for, or in connection with, a demand for dowry. 53 
The significant and well-intentioned legal reforms, however, 
have not been effective.54 Dowry remains an increasing problem. 
Bride burning--often reported as kitchen accidents-is the most 
common form of violence against women. In 1986 alone there were 
1,319 reported cases of bride burning nationally. 55 
The fault lies with the nature of the legislative intervention. 
Stridhan traditionally provided a woman with socially acceptable 
access to a share of her family's property upon marriage when she 
moved into her husband's family. Any remaining property was 
reserved for her brothers or, in other words, kept within her par-
ents' family. Once legislation gave women access to family property 
through inheritance, irrespective of their marital status,56 the belief 
was that the practice of giving stridhan would be redundant. Dowry 
could then be restricted, provided that there were exceptions for 
legitimate gifts upon marriage. While the reasoning behind the 
Dowry Prohibition Act appeared technically logical, the reality was 
that, given patriarchal traditions and attitudes, women do not nor-
mally inherit family property. For example, there are no prohibi-
tions on a person's testamentary power to will exclusively family 
property to the sons. 57 In this situation, the prohibition of dowry 
weakens the socially accepted access to property by women. 
If prohibiting dowry was the only solution, such legislation 
should have included complimentary measures to provide women 
with meaningful access to alternative property. For example, 
'1ointly-owned matrimonial property" remains a foreign concept in 
India.58 If women were allowed to jointly own their stridhan and 
53 INDIA EVIDENCE ACT § ll3-A, No.1 (1872) (India). The India Evidence Act is analo-
gous to the United States Federal Rules of Evidence. 
54 See Fahn, supra note 10, at 120-29 (arguing that the Dowry Prohibition Act is a failure 
because of lack of enforcement, legal loopholes, judicial bias against women, women's lack 
of financial resources, and lack of support from the Indian people). 
55 Van Willigen & Channa, supra note 43, at 369. "Police records do not match hospital 
records for third degree burn cases among younger married women; far more violence 
occurs than crime reports indicate." /d. 
56 See infra part V.B (intestacy). 
57 See infra part V.A (wills). 
58 By contrast, United States law provides a surviving spouse with rights to property 
regardless of gender. There are two prevailing views in the United States. First, separate 
property states have "elective share" statutes that allow a "surviving spouse to take a fee 
interest in property against a will only in property which the decedent owned at death." 
WILLIAM M. MCGOVERN ET AL., WILLS, TRUSTS & ESTATES INCLUDING TAXATION AND FUTURE 
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any marital property, a woman would be entitled to a more equitable 
distribution of resources within the family. Section 6 of the Dowry 
Prohibition Act currently provides that, in cases of dowry death, 
the dowry devolves upon a woman's children or her parents. This 
provision only affects property falling within the definition of the 
term "dowry." Although Section 6 is a positive provision, it should 
be modified to apply to any property belonging to the woman 
including her share of the newly provided marital property. A 
husband and his family would then run the risk of losing far more 
than just dowry upon committing a dowry offense which leads 
either to the woman's death or termination of the marriage. If the 
husband were forced to weigh his need for a greater dowry against 
losing half of the marital property, there may be fewer instances of 
wife harassment or wife burning. Without such precautions, how-
ever, it is not surprising that legislation such as the Dowry Prohibi-
tion Act has been highly ineffective and has had a significantly 
adverse effect on women's property rights, social welfare, and per-
sonal safety. 
B. A Wife'S Economic Rights 
In patriarchal societies in India, although it is customarily ac-
cepted that a woman belongs to her husband's family upon mar-
riage, a woman's rights to property within her husband's family are 
meager. Marriage in India is considered in terms of obligations, not 
rights. The law offers little help to a wife who seeks to be econom-
ically independent. 
As a wife, a woman has little or no control over her husband's 
property. She has no right over any property legally belonging to 
her husband during his lifetime, even if it may have been acquired 
during the pendency of their marriage. The husband may will, gift, 
or waste the entirety of his property as he pleases. In Vinod Kumar 
v. State,59 for example, the Punjab High Court held that a husband 
cannot be charged with criminal breach of trust for failure to return 
the wife's stridhan because "the matrimonial home connotes a joint-
ness of possession and custody by the spouses even with regard to 
INTERESTS § 3.8, at 117 (1st ed. 1988). The amount of the elective share varies from state to 
state. Second, community property states (there are only eight) view marriage as a partnership 
and recognize contributions made by a non-wage earning spouse such as a housewife. [d. 
§ 3.10, at 136. Therefore, a surviving spouse receives half of the couple's community prop-
erty-everything earned during the marriage. [d. § 3.10, at 133. 
59 1982 A.I.R. 372 (P&H). 
1993] GENDER INEQUALITY IN INDIA 73 
the moveable property exclusively owned by each of them."60 The 
Supreme Court overruled Vinod Kumar's 'Jointness" concept in 
Pratibha Rani v. Suraj Kumar, holding that stridhan is the wife's ab-
solute property.61 Thus, the husband or his relatives would have no 
rights over the stridhan and they would be deemed trustees if the 
stridhan was ever placed in their hands.62 
The Pratibha Rani holding is very short-sighted and does not 
promote a women's meaningful access to property.63 A stronger 
statement would have been to accept and expand the 'Joint posses-
sion" theory articulated in Vinod Kumar64 and to expand it so as to 
provide that, if a husband acquires an equal right to the wife's 
stridhan, the wife acquires an equal right to the husband's separate 
property. Furthermore, by restricting its holding to gifts which were 
for the wife's sole use, the Pratibha Rani court may have encouraged 
the taking of dowry or gifts in forms that could be used only by 
husbands. For example, the husband could argue that the gift of a 
television is not stridhan because the wife does not exclusively use 
the item. While an opportunity to introduce the concept of matri-
monial property at a national level was lost in these cases, it will 
hopefully be raised again. 
A woman is also entitled to acquire economic resources through 
employment. Even in such situations, however, the access remains 
limited by legal hurdles. The remedy of restitution of conjugal 
rights65 poses such a problem. One may apply for restitution of 
conjugal rights when either spouse has "withdrawn from the society 
of another" without a reasonable excuse.66 Courts have permitted 
husbands to use this legal remedy to prevent women from working 
in places away from the matrimonial home if a husband does not 
agree with a woman's desire.67 The reasoning behind these decisions 
60 Id. at 376. 
61 1985 A.I.R. 628 (S.C.). 
62Id. at 633-36. 
63 For a contrary view on Pratibha Rani v. Suraj Kaur, see P.S. J aeswal & Nishtha J aeswal, 
Anti-Dowry Legislation in India: An Appraisal, 30 J. OF INDIAN LAW INST. 78 (1988). 
64 1982 A.I.R. 372 (P&H). 
65 Hindu Marriage Act, supra note 6, § 9. In 1983 the High Court of Andhra Pradesh 
held that the restitution of conjugal rights violated the fundamental right of privacy and 
human dignity guaranteed by Article 21 of the Constitution. Sareetha v. Venkata Subbaiah, 
1983 A.I.R. 356 (A.P.). The Supreme Court, however, later overruled this decision. Saroj 
Rani v. Sudarshan Kumar, 1984 A.I.R. 1562 (S.C.). 
66 Hindu Marriage Act, supra note 6, § 9. 
67 Surrinder Kaur v. Gurdeep Singh, 1973 A.I.R. 134 (P&H); Gaya Prasad v. Bhagwati, 
1966 A.I.R. 212 (M.P.); Pothuraju v. Radha, 1965 A.I.R. 407 (A.P.); Tirath Kaur v. Kirpal 
Singh, 1964 A.I.R. 28 (Punj.). But see Radhakrishnan v. Dhanalakshmi, 1975 A.I.R. 331, 332 
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is that, because it is the husband's prerogative to choose the site of 
the matrimonial home, it therefore is the wife's obligation to live 
with the husband. 
In Carg v. Carg,68 however, the Delhi High Court held that it 
would be unconstitutional to give the husband the exclusive right 
to select the matrimonial home.69 The court indicated that where 
the husband has a less renumerative position than the wife, and 
where the husband's conduct has been reproachable, the wife has 
a valid reason to live separately.70 Carg does not actually provide a 
significant advancement for women because the court also held that, 
where a husband and wife cannot agree on the matrimonial home, 
the husband must have the final say.71 For example, the law does 
not support a wife's desire to work in a distant place if the husband 
has the financial ability to look after her. In such a case it would be 
possible for the husband to obtain a decree of restitution of conjugal 
rights. Furthermore, the husband may obtain a decree of divorce 
one year after a decree of restitution of conjugal rights. 72 
Similarly, in the absence of a matrimonial proceeding for di-
vorce or maintenance, the wife has no right to be maintained if she 
chooses to live separately, except upon proof of specific conditions.73 
By failing to place an obligation on the husband to support an 
economically dependent wife who chooses to live separately, the law 
does not provide the woman with an alternative remedy if there 
are inadequate grounds for divorce or judicial separation. Courts 
have both legitimized spousal abuse and shown a willingness to 
define narrowly stringent conditions by holding that beating a wife 
"once or twice" during a span of three years is not an adequate 
ground for living separately. 74 
Consequently, during the course of the marriage, the wife re-
mains under the economic control of her husband. In light of the 
strong social and traditional attitudes that perpetuate such control, 
(Mad.) (holding there is no unqualified rule that the wife must remain with her husband 
where separation results from financial needs or an implied arrangement between the cou-
ple); Pravinaben v. S.T. Arya, 1975 A.I.R. 69 (Guj.) (same). 
68 1978 A.I.R. 296 (Del.). 
69 [d. at 301. 
70 [d. at 302. 
71 [d. 
72 Hindu Marriage Act, supra note 6, § 13 (l-A)(ii). 
73 Such exceptions occur when the husband: deserts the wife, acts with cruelty causing 
apprehension that she will be harmed or injured, suffers from virulent leprosy, has another 
living wife, keeps a concubine in the house, ceases to be a Hindu, or any other cause that 
justifies her living separately. Hindu Adoption and Maintenance Act, supra note 25, § 18(2). 
74 Shobha v. Manohar, 2 DIVORCE AND MATRIMONIAL CASES 169, 170 (1989). 
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it is disheartening that legal reform not only fails to attempt to 
break the economic dependence of women within the relationship 
of marriage, but even perpetuates it through existing archaic legal 
provIsIOns. 
IV. WOMEN'S PROPERTY RIGHTS UPON DIVORCE 
Before the Hindu Marriage Act of 1955, divorce was not per-
mitted.75 The Hindu Marriage Act provides both the husband and 
the wife the right to file a petition for a divorce decree.76 Aside 
from its social unacceptability, divorce is usually not a realistic option 
for most women who have little or no financial independence or 
education. 77 
The legal system is inherently unfair to women seeking a di-
vorce. As mentioned previously, a woman is the legal owner of her 
stridhan.78 Under Section 27 of the Hindu Marriage Act, a divorce 
court may only adjudicate rights regarding property "presented, at 
or about the time of the marriage, which may belong jointly" to the 
couple. 79 Because stridhan is not joint property, a woman must en-
dure two lawsuits. She must first participate in the divorce proceed-
ings. The woman must then bring another suit in a civil court 
against her ex-husband to recover her stridhan. The additional legal 
expenses and stress from prolonged litigation deter women from 
trying to recover their property.80 Another unpleasant alternative 
is that the wife can initiate an action against her husband for a 
criminal breach of trust if she can prove that the disputed property 
is part of a dowry which is illegal.81 Section 27 of the Hindu Mar-
riage Act therefore operates against a woman's economic interests. 
Upon separation or divorce, both spouses have the right to ask 
for maintenance, although many women do not even know of this 
75 Vinaya Saijwani, The Personal Laws of Divorce in India with a Comment on Chaudry v. 
Chaudry, 11 WOMEN'S RTs. L. REP. 41, 50 (1989) (provides comparison between Hindu and 
Muslim personal laws of divorce). 
76 See supra note 6, § 13(1). The grounds for divorce include: adultery, cruelty, desertion, 
apostasy, mental disorder, leprosy, sexually transmitted diseases, entrance into a religious 
order, or absence. Id. 
77 Terree McGovern, Modern Matrimonial Matters in India, 70 WOMEN LAW. J. 18, 19 
(1984). 
78 Pratibha Rani v. Suraj Kumar, 1985 A.I.R. 628, 636 (P&H). 
79 See supra note 6, § 27. 
80 See Maharajan v. Sarojini, 1988 A.I.R. 175, 178 (Or.). The court further stated that 
"the consequence is not an enviable one, particularly in view of the weaker status of women 
in our society and thus there is urgent need of a remedial measure through appropriate 
legislation." Id. 
81 Pratibha Rani, 1985 A.I.R. at 643. 
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right. 82 Although maintenance orders are case-specific, courts have 
been relatively sympathetic towards women. Thus, in Radhakumari 
v. Nair,83 the court held that a husband could not claim immunity 
from liability to pay maintenance even if the wife was supported by 
her parents.84 There is no statutory definition of maintenance. 
Courts therefore consider factors such as social status, age, educa-
tion, and the needs of the children.85 In Urmila Devi v. Hari Prakash 
Bansal,86 for instance, the court held that an able-bodied husband 
is capable of working, and, thus, should maintain and support his 
wife despite the fact that neither spouse had an income.87 Further-
more, in Waghmare v. Waghmare,88 the court held that the wife's 
right to pendente lite maintenance and to litigation expenses should 
be available without reference to conduct because the wife's claim 
to maintenance is an incident of the status of matrimony.89 
A woman must face many hurdles in her fight to obtain main-
tenance. For example, in Guredev Kaur v. Channo,90 the Punjab and 
Haryana High Court held that because it is a personal obligation, 
the payment of maintenance must cease with the death of the 
husband.91 The widow would then have to file an application for 
maintenance against her husband's estate pursuant to Section 22 of 
the Hindu Adoption and Maintenance Act.92 Another court has 
held that an agreement in which a husband waives his right to child 
custody in exchange for the wife's relinquishment of her right to 
maintenance does not violate public policy.93 
Courts traditionally have not been generous regarding the 
amount of a maintenance order granted to a wife. In Rambu Sharma 
v. State,94 the court held that pendente lite maintenance is one-fifth 
of the husband's average net income for the past three years minus 
the wife's income.95 If a person who has sufficient means refuses to 
82 Hindu Marriage Act, supra note 6, §§ 24, 25; Hindu Adoption and Maintenance Act, 
supra note 25, § 18; INDIA CODE CRIM. PROC. § 125; see McGovern, supra note 77, at 19. 
8' 1983 A.I.R. 139 (Ker.). 
84Id. at 143. 
85Id. at 145. 
86 1988 A.I.R. 84 (P&H). 
87Id. at 86. 
88 1979 A.I.R. 264 (Born.). 
89Id. at 266. Pendente lite maintenance provides support during the proceedings. 
90 1986 A.I.R. 251 (P&H). 
91Id. at 252. 
92 Id. 
9' Manjit Singh v. Savita Kiran, 1983 A.I.R. 281 (P&H). 
94 1989 A.I.R. 261 (M.P.). 
95Id. 
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provide maintenance, the Code of Criminal Procedure requires 
such person to make a monthly maintenance allowance that cannot 
exceed 500 rupees ($18.00 per month).96 Moreover, the Code does 
not require the magistrate to consider the husband's financial 
strength. Positive movement in the area of maintenance amounts, 
however, was seen in Hema v. Lakshmana Bhat. 97 
In Hema, the court rejected the contention that the "one-fifth 
of the husband's income" ceiling in the Indian Divorce Act applies 
to Section 24 of the Hindu Marriage Act.98 After considering the 
parties' affluent background and length of marriage, the court held 
that 1,000 rupees per month, and not 800 rupees per month as the 
lower court had ordered, was a reasonable amount.99 Hopefully 
courts will follow Hema's lead and grant financially realistic amounts 
after consideration of factors such as the length of the marriage 
and the woman's contribution to the marriage. 
The standard for modifying or rescinding maintenance orders 
varies between husbands and wives. The concept of "chastity," an 
archaic provision that survived legal reform, also deters a woman 
from litigating her right to maintenance. Before granting a main-
tenance order against her husband, a court must inquire into the 
wife's chastity.lOo Courts can manipulate easily the concept of "chast-
ity," as there is no statutory definition. If the husband's matrimonial 
petition is granted on the basis of the wife's adultery, the wife cannot 
claim maintenance. lOI Courts have held, however, that a wife may 
receive a subsistence maintenance even if the divorce was granted 
on the grounds of the wife's adultery.102 One court has held that 
while a claim regarding a wife's chastity is relevant to determine the 
quantum of maintenance, it cannot be the basis to refuse mainte-
96 INDIA CODE CRIM. PROC. § 125(1). 
97 1986 A.l.R. 130 (Ker.). 
98/d. at 132. The court further stated that "the [c]oncept of equality between the spouses 
has gained recognition. That is why [Section] 24 of the Act enables either spouse to make a 
claim. [The] [s]tatus of the wife as an equal partner in marriage is now generally accepted." 
[d. 
99 [d. at 133. 
100 Hindu Marriage Act, supra note 6, § 25(3); Hindu Adoption and Maintenance Act, 
supra note 25, § 18(3); INDIA CODE CRIM. PROC. § 125(4) (1973). 
101 Hindu Marriage Act, supra note 6, § 25(3); Sardari Lal v. Vishano, 1970 A.I.R. 150 
(J&K); Sachindra Nath v. Banamala, 1960 A.I.R. 575 (Cal.) (a wife divorced on the grounds 
of proven unchastity should be left to the resources of her immorality). See PARAS DIWAN, 
MODERN HINDU LAw 224-26 (1981) for a more detailed discussion of the preceding cases. 
102 Gulab Jagdusa Kakwane v. Kamal Gulab Kakwane, 1985 A.I.R. 88 (Born.); Yogeshwar 
Prasad v. Jyotei Rani, 1981 A.I.R. 99 (Del.); Nathulal v. Mana Devi, 1971 A.l.R. 208 (Raj.). 
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nance. 103 Existing maintenance orders may be modified or cancelled 
if the woman can be characterized later as "unchaste."104 
By contrast, if the husband's adultery is the grounds for di-
vorce, a grant of maintenance in favor of a husband may be mod-
ified or rescinded only if "he has sexual intercourse with any woman 
outside wedlock."lo5 The "chastity" standard for women and the 
"intercourse outside wedlock" standard for men creates the situa-
tion where a husband's maintenance order will not be disturbed. It 
is impossible for a husband to have a relationship "out of wedlock" 
because the divorce and order of maintenance dissolve the "wed-
lock." 
Even if the court grants a maintenance order to a woman, she 
still faces difficulties in collecting the money. 106 Thus, while the area 
of maintenance has been more favorable to women, the fight to 
enjoy these benefits is tedious because of archaic legal provisions 
and a costly legal process. There has been substantial legal progress 
in that both a husband and wife have the right to seek mainte-
nance. 107 Legal reform, however, will not be complete until the 
elimination of many archaic provisions can be achieved. The law 
must recognize that the concept of maintenance is in itself obsolete. 
A woman seeking maintenance is merely asking for the return of 
her own property-a share of the joint marital property which she 
has helped amass during the marriage. Rules of chastity108 and one-
fifth share109 have no place in such a proceeding. 
V. GENDER AND PROPERTY RIGHTS UPON DEATH 
A. Right to Inherit Property by Will 
Under Indian law, a will always takes priority over the devo-
lution of property through an intestacy statute. lIO Both a husband 
103 Yogeshwar Prasad, 1981 A.I.R. at 99. 
104 Hindu Marriage Act, supra note 6, § 25(3); Hindu Adoption and Maintenance Act, 
supra note 25, § 25. 
10' Hindu Marriage Act, supra note 6, § 25(3). 
106 In Pankajakshan v. Challamma, the court stated: 
Even after fighting many courts for establishing a meager sum by way of mainte-
nance, [the woman] is driven to a second set of legal proceedings to effectively get 
the money in hand. 
2 DIVORCE AND MATRIMONIAL CASES 135, 138 (1987). 
107 Hindu Marriage Act, supra note 6, §§ 24, 25. 
108 [d. § 25(3). 
109 See Rambu Sharma v. State, 1989 A.I.R. 261 (M.P.). 
110 Hindu Succession Act, supra note 4, § 30. The India Succession Act governs all 
questions regarding the validity of a will. 
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and a wife have full testamentary powers over their property. I II 
Although there is no prima facie discrimination, such unrestricted 
testamentary power is detrimental to women in a patrilineal and 
patriarchal society. Because property normally passes to male heirs, 
female heirs often lose all rights to property, except the right to be 
maintained in some cases. The propounder of the will has the 
burden to remove all reasonable doubt surrounding suspicious cir-
cumstances regarding the execution of the will, such as a shaky 
signature, a feeble mind, or unfair and unjust disposition of property. 112 
In Khusbir Singh v. The State,113 the Delhi High Court did not con-
sider the total disinheritance of the wife and daughter by will in 
favor of a son as an unfair or unjust disposition of property.114 The 
Singh court highlighted the fact that the father "could have well 
thought that he will solemnize the marriage of his daughter during 
his lifetime and that may have led him to disinherit her."115 The 
court further stated that "it is not unknown of Indian parents to 
deprive their daughters of any share in their estate."116 This rea-
soning illustrates the traditional belief that a father's obligation 
consists of conducting his daughter's marriage and transferring his 
own remaining property to his male progeny. 
B. Right to Inherit Property Upon Intestacy 
Access to productive resources or other family property 
through inheritance may be the only source of economic power for 
seventy-one percent of illiterate and unskilled women. ll7 The 
Hindu Succession Act, which governs all issues concerning intestacy, 
provides significant changes to women's traditional property 
rights. lIS This statute eliminates traditional distinctions between 
married or unmarried daughters and women who have or do not 
have children. 119 Under the Hindu Succession Act, daughters, sons, 
III Id. 
112 Venkatarama Aiyar v. Thimmajamma, 1959 A.l.R. 443,444 (S.C.) (emphasis added). 
113 1990 A.l.R. 59 (Del.). 
ll4Id. 
115Id. at 64. 
116Id. 
117 See INDIA 1991, supra note 8, at 13. 
118 An intestate is one who does not dispose of property through a will. See Hindu 
Succession Act, supra note 4, § 3(g). 
119 See Chando Mahtain v. Khublal Mahto, 1983 A.l.R. 33 (PaL) (holding the Hindu 
Succession Act abrogates the divestiture of property upon marriage provision in the now 
repealed Hindu Widows Remarriage Act of 1937). 
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widows, and widowers have equal rights to inherit their parents' or 
deceased spouse's self-acquired and intestate property.120 A wid-
owed daughter-in-law also has a right to her father-in-Iaw's intestate 
property121 if she does not remarry before her father-in-Iaw's 
death. 122 Women are the absolute owners of any property acquired 
through intestacy.123 The Hindu Succession Act, however, only rep-
resents partial reform of women's rights, as many discriminatory 
traditions have been codified. 
1. Women's Right to Inherit Joint Family Property 
The joint family, or "coparcenary" is the typical Indian family 
where three generations of patrilineal kinship live in the same 
household. 124 In such a patrilineal family, the son is the natural 
successor, a good investment, and insurance for the family.125 The 
joint family continues as long as there is a male member, even by 
adoption. Coparceners control property in a joint family. A copar-
cener is a lineal male descendant (up to the third generation) who 
acquires the right of ownership by birth; 126 however, women cannot 
be coparceners. 127 Each coparcener has ownership over the entire 
property until partition,128 and may ask for such a partition. 129 
Furthermore, possession and enjoyment of property is common. 130 
120 See supra note 4, § 8 (lists those entitled to property of male Hindu intestate) and 
§ 15(1) (lists those entitled to property of female Hindu intestate). Self-acquired property is 
individually acquired and can be distinguished from inherited or joint family property. 
121Id. § 8. 
122Id. § 24. 
123Id. § 4. 
124 DESAI & KRiSHNARAj, supra note I, at 186-87. Hindu law comprises the branches of 
Mitakshara and Dayabhaga. This part analyzes the Mitakshara coparcenary in which the 
three generations of males are "related to the male ego as grandfather and his brothers, 
father and his brothers, cousins, sons and nephews, and their wives, unmarried daughters 
and sisters." Id. at 187; see SUNDERLAL T. DESAI, MULLA PRINCIPLES OF HINDU LAw 238-317 
(1990); Gurupad v. Hirabhai, 1978 A.I.R. 1239 (S.C.) (defining coparcenary). Unlike the 
Mitakshara coparcenary, which is applied in the majority of India, the Dayabhaga coparcenary 
is confined to Bengal and Assam. Lucy Carroll, Daughter'S Right of Inheritance in India: A 
Perspective on the Problem of Dowry, 25 MODERN ASIAN STUDIES 791, 793 (1991). For a detailed 
explanation of the Dayabhaga coparcenary, see id. at 802-05. 
12. DESAI & KRiSHNARAj, supra note I, at 187-88. 
126 Carroll, supra note 124, at 793. 
127 See Raghunath Tiwary v. Rikhiya, 1985 A.I.R. 29, 30 (Pat.) (daughter does not have 
right to joint property upon birth). 
128 See Carroll, supra note 124, at 793. 
129Id. at 794. A partition increases the number of joint family estates; it does not create 
separate estates. Id. 
ISO See Carroll, supra note 124, at 793. 
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Property may be alienated for legal necessity only upon concurrence 
of other coparceners. 131 A deceased member's interest lapses upon 
his death and merges into the coparcenary property; however, his 
interest does not devolve upon his natural heirs. 132 Other dependent 
females have the right to be maintained by joint family property. A 
widow obtains an equal share upon partition, but does not have the 
right to ask for a partition of family property.133 The law recognizes 
this inequitable customary arrangement and even encourages the 
formation of such units by treating these joint families as separate 
taxable entities. 134 
Traditionally, the joint family system excluded the Hindu 
daughter from succession to her father's property if there was a 
son, son's son, or a widow. 135 The Hindu Succession Act, however, 
does not significantly alter the inequitable distribution of joint fam-
ily property to women. 136 The statute only partially amends the 
customary property rules, allowing a coparcener's interest to de-
volve through a will or through the Hindu Succession Act to a 
surviving female relative specified in Class I or to a male relative in 
Class I who claims through such female relative. 137 Therefore, while 
Hindu males own a share of the family rights at birth, females must 
inherit it.13s 
131 Gurupad v. Hirabhai, 1978 A.I.R. 1239 (s.c.). 
132 Carroll, supra note 124, at 793. 
IS. Hindu Succession Act, supra note 4, § 23. 
IS. Income Tax Act §§ 2(31), 10(2), as amended by Finance Act, 1989 and Direct Tax Laws 
(Amendment) Act, No.3 (1989) (India), reprinted in M.C. BHANDARI, THE INCOME-TAX ACT! 
RULES WITH REFERENCER (1989-90); See Maureen A. Maloney, An Analysis of Direct Taxes in 
India: A Feminist Perspective, 30 J. INDIAN L. INST. 397, 404 (1988). 
ISS Carroll, supra note 124, at 791-92. 
136 The Hindu Succession Act addresses only the Mitakshara system. See supra note 4, 
§ 6; supra note 124 and accompanying text (definition of a Mitakshara coparcenary). 
U7 See supra note 4, § 6; see infra note 147 (list of persons in Class I of the Schedule). Raj 
Rani v. The Chief Settlement Commissioner, 1984 A.I.R. 1234 (S.C.), provides an example 
of property succession: 
Where a Hindu died after the enforcement of the Act leaving behind him his widow, 
three sons and three daughters, the devolution of his Mitakshara coparcenary prop-
erty would be as follows: ... [H]e would have [received] one-fifth interest on partition 
between him and his wife and three sons. If once his interest was determined to be 
one-fifth before his death, his interest would devolve upon his widow, three sons 
and three daughters equally and thus the share of each one of them would be one-
fifth [multiplied by] one-seventh that is one thirty-fifth each and because the widow 
had inherited her husband's interest after his death her share would be augmented 
by one-fifth that is one thirty-fifth [plus] one-fifth [which] equals eight thirty-fifths. 
Id. at 1235. 
IS8 Van Willigen & Channa, supra note 43, at 374. 
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Because inheritance is an area where the state and national 
government can legislate concurrently,139 a few states have provided 
women more equality in the joint family system. For example, the 
states of Andhra Pradesh and Tamil Nadu have improved signifi-
cantly a woman's status under the joint family system by permitting 
women to assume the status of a coparcener. 140 The state of Kerala 
has even abolished the joint family system altogether. 141 Hopefully, 
other states will follow these leads and recognize the social and 
economic value of women. 
2. Women's Right to the Dwelling House 
Female heirs to a male Hindu intestate's property cannot ask 
for a partition of the intestate's dwelling house in which the intes-
tate's family lives until the male heirs choose to divide their respec-
tive shares. 142 This is so even if the house is part of the intestate's 
separate property. A female heir who is a daughter has the right of 
residence in the dwelling house only if she is single, has been 
deserted by or is separated from her husband, or is a widow. 143 A 
widowed daughter loses her right to residence upon remarriage. 144 
Thus, the law in this area reiterates traditional patriarchal concepts 
towards women. 
3. Property Succession of Male and Female Intestates 
Under the Hindu Succession Act, the property of male and 
female intestates devolves differently. There is a clear preference 
for agnates145 over cognates. 146 Living children and the widow share 
a male's intestacy property with relatives listed in Class I of the 
schedule. 147 In the absence of these heirs, the property devolves 
159 BASU, supra note 19, at 515. 
140 Van Willigen & Channa, supra note 43, at 375. 
141Id. 
142 Hindu Succession Act, supra note 4, § 23; see Punwasi v. Sukha Devi, 1986 A.I.R. 139, 
140 (All.) (male intestate's married daughter may not ask for a partition of the dwelling 
house). 
14S Hindu Succession Act, supra note 4, § 23. 
144Id. 
145 A person is an agnate of another if the two people are related by blood or adoption 
wholly through males. Id. § 3(a). 
146 A person is a cognate of another if the two are related by blood or adoption, but not 
wholly through males. Id. § 3(c). 
147 Class I includes the son, daughter, widow, mother, son of a pre-deceased son, daughter 
of a pre-deceased son, son of a pre-deceased daughter, daughter of a pre-deceased daughter, 
widow of a pre-deceased son, son of a pre-deceased son of a pre-deceased son, daughter of 
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upon relatives listed in Class II of the schedule, which gives priority 
to the male intestate's father and does not make any provisions for 
the intestate's wife's relatives. 148 
By contrast, succession to a female intestate's property depends 
on the type of property. In the absence of children, property in-
herited from the female intestate's parents devolves upon her fa-
ther's heirs.149 Property inherited from her husband or father-in-
law would go to the husband's heirs in the absence of children by 
the husband. 150 A female intestate's self-acquired property, a gift, 
or property received under a valid will first devolves upon her 
children and her husband. 151 Absent the preceding heirs, the prop-
erty devolves upon her husband's heirs l52 and then upon her par-
ents. 153 Once again, concepts of gender equality give way to patriar-
chal considerations that treat women as extensions of their husbands 
by favoring their husbands' heirs. 
C. Widows' Property Rights 
As previously mentioned, a widow has the right to inherit prop-
erty from her husband's estate, but she cannot prevent her husband 
from transferring his property to a third person through a will. 154 
Her father-in-law has a legal obligation to maintain her only if he 
has coparcenary property and only if she cannot maintain herself 
through her husband, parents, children, or their estates. 155 A wid-
owed daughter-in-law ceases to receive maintenance upon her re-
marriage. 156 Patriarchy is abandoned, as the father-in-Iaw's obliga-
tion does not attach unless the widow's parents are financially unable 
to maintain their daughter. 
a pre-deceased son of a pre-deceased son, and widow of a pre-deceased son of a pre-deceased 
son. Id. § 8(a). "The Schedule," which is listed as an appendix, is read in conjunction with 
Section 8 of the Hindu Succession Act. 
148Id. § 8(b). 
149Id. § 15(2)(a); see Raghuwar v. Janki Prasad, 1981 A.I.R. 39 (M.P.) ("inheritance" in 
Hindu Succession Act § 15(2)(a) refers to intestacy property, not property passed under a 
will). 
150 Hindu Succession Act, supra note 4, § 15(2)(b); see Jayantilal v. Chhanalal, 1968 A.I.R. 
212 (Gug.). 
151 Hindu Succession Act, supra note 4, § 15(a)(I)(a). 
152Id. § 15(l)(b). 
153Id. § 15(l)(c). 
154Id. § 30. 
155 Hindu Adoption and Maintenance Act, supra note 25, § 19. 
156Id. 
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An illustration may help to clarify this concept. Consider an 
uneducated woman living in a nuclear family without any source of 
independent earnings. This woman has been married for fifteen 
years. Her husband dies, transferring his property to a third party 
by will. The wife cannot prevent this transfer nor can she sue her 
husband's estate for maintenance under the Hindu Marriage Act 
or the Criminal Procedure Code. Her father-in-law does not have 
the obligation to maintain her because there is no coparcenary 
property.157 Her parents are not legally bound to maintain her 
because she is not a minor158 and is married. 159 The law casts an 
obligation on the husband's heirs (the third party) to maintain the 
widow. 160 A better resolution would be to restrict the husband's 
testamentary powers so that he would be obligated to leave a specific 
percentage of his property for his dependents. 
VI. WOMEN'S ABILITY TO OWN AGRICULTURAL LAND 
Hindu women traditionally have had few opportunities to be 
landholding members of their families. This injustice remains true 
in modern India and elevates the level of economic disparity be-
tween men and women because land is an important source of 
economic and social power in this predominantly agricultural soci-
ety. Legislative reform has institutionalized the gender bias by giving 
male family members more access to land ownership and land 
resources than female family members. For example, in Uttar 
Pradesh, a state which comprises one-sixth of the population, the 
interest in land passes first "to the male descendants in the male 
line of descent."161 The land passes to the widow or widowed mother 
of the pre-deceased male descendant only if there are no such males 
available and only if the widow has not remarried. 162 
Agricultural land comprises the bulk of real property in In-
dia. 163 The Hindu Succession Act, however, does not govern the 
devolution of tenancies of agricultural land. 164 Agricultural land 
157 Hindu Succession Act, supra note 4, § 4. 
158 Hindu Adoption and Maintenance Act, supra note 25, § 21(v). 
159/d. § 20. 
160 Id. §§ 21, 22. 
161 GOVERNMENT OF INDIA, DEPARTMENT OF SOCIAL WELFARE, NEW DEHU, TOWARDS 
EQUAUTY, REPoRT OF THE COMMITTEE OF THE STATUS OF WOMEN IN INDIA 137 (1975) [here-
inafter TOWARDS EQUAUTY]. 
1621d. 
1Mld. 
16< See supra note 4, I 4(2). 
1993] GENDER INEQUALITY IN INDIA 85 
devolves according to the legislation of individual states. 165 Land 
reform laws cannot be challenged on grounds of violating a fun-
damental right because they fall within the Indian Constitution's 
ninth schedule. 166 Furthermore, the lack of statutory definitions in 
the Hindu Succession Act or the General Clauses Act of 1897 for 
terms such as "tenancy rights" has given the states a great amount 
of discretion. The result has been the enactment of many state laws 
that restrict a woman's interest in agricultural land even though 
women constitute the majority of the labor force in agricultural 
industries-a key sector of India's economy.167 
Land reform laws and procedures restrict the size of land hold-
ings. Surplus land is distributed to landless persons or used for 
developmental purposes. 16S These laws also discriminate on the 
basis of gender. For example, when determining the ceiling on land 
that a family may hold in Maharashtra, land held by a daughter 
comprises part of the total amount of land held by the family, while 
a son holds land separately.169 Government regulations regarding 
development projects also reflect the bias against the concept of 
women owning land. In the Sardar Sarovar Project, a power project 
in Gujarat, the state resettlement policy provides separate agricul-
tural and residential land for adult male sons of those families 
affected by the project. 170 The project considers adult daughters as 
members of their primary families instead of providing them with 
separate property. 171 
Land is a scarce but very important economic resource in India. 
Admittedly, dividing land between sons and daughters may split 
the size of the holding which may diminish the land's economic 
value.172 This economic disadvantage, however, does not justify de-
priving women of land, the means to empowerment. Gender-neu-
tral efforts must be formulated to maintain land holdings at a 
productive economic level, especially in a country that claims to 
uphold the constitutional principle of gender equality. 
165 BASU, supra note 19, at 507. 
166 INDIA CONST. art. 31-B. 
167 See TOWARDS EQUALITY, supra note 161, at 137. 
168 The ninth schedule of the Indian Constitution lists various Land Reform and Land 
Ceiling Acts for the states. 
169 Maharashtra Agricultural Land (Ceiling on Holdings) Act, No. 26 (1961) (India) § 3. 
170 Government of Gujarat, Government Resolution No. RHB-1085-D (Nov. 1, 1985), at 5. 
17l [d. 
172 See ALTEKAR, supra note 40, at 246. 
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VII. CONCLUSION 
Gender analysis of Hindu law relating to a woman's access to 
property within the home reveals a consistent pattern of subordi-
nation of women's economic interests. The combination of high 
levels of illiteracy, lack of outside training, and discriminatory social 
traditions further prevents a woman from gaining access to eco-
nomic resources. While enjoying the formal status of equality at 
law, in essence, a woman remains economically dependent on her 
parents, husband, or children from birth until death. Manu lives 
with a vengeance! 173 
Law can be an important tool for social transformation. In 
India, however, law often perpetuates the economic subordination 
of women through the lack of an equitable framework. The primary 
task remains to amend all legislative provisions that institutionalize 
economic distributions based on gender differences and those that 
increase a woman's economic dependency. Such legislative reforms 
must be accomplished in a sensitive manner, recognizing that the 
implementation of gender-neutral legislation will not be accepted 
automatically into the hierarchical and male-dominated society. The 
present impact of legislation on Indian society admittedly has been 
very limited. Patriarchy, age-old social traditions, unequal economic 
relationships, lack of enforcement, and lack of means for women 
to become more independent, all playa significant role in creating 
and sustaining the inequality of women. Examination of women's 
status in the family and society is incomplete without the discussion 
of problems in a holistic manner. 
Removal of legal constraints and legitimization of reform of 
property rights is an important and catalytic first step for women. 
Equal access to productive resources will provide women with an 
enabling environment in which they can break down gender-based 
traditional barriers that currently seem impenetrable. An equitable 
share of family property, however little at first, will give women 
relative strength within the family to resist oppressive relationships. 
Women will be taken seriously only when they have these economic 
rights. Until then, the emergence of women as equal players in the 
mainstream of Indian life will remain as it has for the last four 
decades-a slow, tedious, and sometimes regressive process. 
175 See supra note 1 and accompanying text. 
